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PROCEDURE AS SUBSTANCE
Elizabeth M. Schneider*
INTRODUCTION
Over many years, Judge Jack Weinstein has brought his incredible
knowledge of procedure as both a scholar and former teacher of pro-
cedure to his work as a federal judge.  But he has also brought a strik-
ing sensitivity to the nuances of procedure in judicial practice.  He is a
procedural expert who cares about substance, but sees substance in all
aspects of judging.  In this Article, I explore the ways in which he sees
procedure as a vehicle to get to substance, but also how he sees proce-
dure as inherently and deeply substantive and important in its own
right.  For Judge Weinstein, procedure has value and meaning in how
it is practiced, implemented, and experienced.1  I suggest that it is not
only Judge Weinstein’s decision making about procedure that is
unique, but also that many cross-cutting procedural dimensions of his
judging reflect, and send important messages on, substance.  His inno-
vation in many dimensions of procedure is crucial in the service of
substance.
I briefly examine a number of different facets of how Judge Wein-
stein makes decisions and uses procedure in the civil context.2  The
examples run the gamut from individual cases to mass torts, to the
way that he organizes information, treats litigants, and relies on
* Rose L. Hoffer Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School.  I am grateful to Stephan Lands-
man for inviting me to participate in this Clifford Symposium, and to all the participants, espe-
cially Anita Bernstein, for their comments on and reactions to an earlier draft.  Special thanks to
Claire Gavin, Brooklyn Law School ‘16, and Mary Bruch, Brooklyn Law School ‘14, who pro-
vided helpful research assistance, and to the Brooklyn Law School Faculty Research Program for
generous support of my work.
1. I have explored these issues concerning the meaning of procedure elsewhere. See generally
Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial Practice: The Disparate
Impact on Civil Rights and Employment Discrimination Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 517 (2010)
[hereinafter Schneider, Changing Shape of Pretrial Practice]; Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dan-
gers of Summary Judgment: Gender and Federal Civil Litigation, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 705 (2007)
[hereinafter Schneider, Dangers]; Elizabeth M. Schneider, Gendering and Engendering Process,
61 U. CIN. L. REV. 1223 (1993); Elizabeth M. Schneider & Nancy Gertner, “Only Procedural”:
Thoughts on the Substantive Law Dimensions of Preliminary Procedural Decisions in Employ-
ment Discrimination Cases, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 767 (2012/13).
2. The 20th Clifford Symposium was entitled Jack Weinstein’s Impact on Civil Justice in
America.
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sources, to the way that he structures his cases.  Although Judge Wein-
stein’s procedural contributions are often thought of as largely in the
fields of mass torts and aggregation, I look at a broader and deeper
range of attitudes and judicial inclinations.  I begin with some short
excerpts from Judge Weinstein’s own writing on the scope of proce-
dure.3  I then turn to different aspects of the Judge’s decision making.4
They reveal the substantive dimensions of procedure and, I argue,
challenge conventional notions of “proceduralism.”  They expand our
understandings of the meaning of procedure and process.
II. JUDGE WEINSTEIN’S VIEWS OF PROCEDURE
Judge Weinstein is, of course, a prolific scholar and writer, as well as
a judge.  He has written widely on almost every aspect of the law.  I
mention here just a few of his observations about procedure to set the
stage.
One important theme in Judge Weinstein’s writing is that procedure
often hides substance.  For example, Judge Weinstein observes that
“[a]s guardians and keepers of the rules, proceduralists have a duty to
flush out these substantive arguments from behind their procedural
camouflage and subject them to open and honest debate.”5  It is sig-
nificant that he uses the term “proceduralists” in this way.  Judge
Weinstein explains elsewhere that  “by proceduralists, [he does] not
mean a breed of narrow-minded legal militarists committed to notions
of perfect procedure at odds with social needs.”6  Proceduralists are
“keepers of the rules,” but they also have to expose “procedural cam-
ouflage”7 because “substance has been able to hide behind recent ef-
forts toward procedural change.”8  He emphasizes that judges should
not “elevate form over substance” because “rules function in the ser-
vice of substantive outcomes.”9
A second theme is the importance of access to courts.  Judge Wein-
stein has regularly made strong statements on changes in procedure
3. See infra Part II.
4. See infra Part III.
5. Jack B. Weinstein, Procedural Reform as a Surrogate for Substantive Law Revision, 59
BROOK. L. REV. 827, 829 (1993).
6. Jack B. Weinstein, After Fifty Years of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Are the Barriers
to Justice Being Raised?, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1901, 1905 n.10 (1989) (citations omitted).  He goes
on to say, “Rather, I mean to embrace thinkers of diverse backgrounds and professional stations
in the proceduralist community, just as this conference includes representatives of faculty, bench
and bar, with widely disparate expertise and viewpoints.” Id.
7. Weinstein, supra note 5, at 829.
8. Id. at 828.
9. Id.
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that have restricted access to courts and have had a disproportionate
impact on access by the poor.  Recently, he observed, “In pro se cases,
the court must make special efforts to keep litigants out of the law’s
procedural tar pits through such techniques as liberal interpretation of
pleadings and warnings on summary judgment.”10  He has criticized
the myths of the “litigation explosion,” “discovery abuse,” and the use
of procedure as a vehicle for direct curtailment of substantive rights.11
But Judge Weinstein has also emphasized that judges “must struggle
against their status to wall off public access to the courts.”12  It is sig-
nificant that he sees this effort to close access as a problem of privi-
lege.  The issue of judicial status, the elitism of federal judges, and the
degree to which federal judges are situated in their own experiences,
is a third theme.
To his recent biographer, Jeffrey Morris, Judge Weinstein has been
“audacious” in his use of procedure.13  Morris notes that Judge Wein-
stein has admitted that he plays “fast and loose” with a lot of proce-
dure.14  Morris suggests that Judge Weinstein has not been interested
in jurisdiction, mootness, or standing; he wants to get to the merits
and thinks that “power should be exercised.”15
III. FACETS OF JUDGE WEINSTEIN’S DECISION MAKING
In this Part, I spell out some facets of Judge Weinstein’s decision
making that are often mentioned only in passing when discussing
Judge Weinstein’s judicial work.  Here, I want to make them front and
center and recognize them as significant and meaningful aspects of
procedure.  Like recent scholarship that has illuminated the amount of
time that judges spend on the bench16 and emphasized its importance,
the ways in which judges conduct themselves on the bench are often
invisible, and not even seen as procedural.  These aspects of judging
need to be given more scholarly attention and viewed as integral
dimensions of procedure.
10. Jack B. Weinstein, Address, Notes on Uniformity and Individuality in Mass Litigation, 64
DEPAUL L. REV. 251, 254 (2015).
11. Weinstein, supra note 5, at 829–32.
12. JEFFREY B. MORRIS, LEADERSHIP ON THE FEDERAL BENCH: THE CRAFT AND ACTIVISM
OF JACK WEINSTEIN 195–96 (2011).
13. Id. at 112; see also Elizabeth M. Schneider, 64 J. LEGAL EDUC. 339, 339 (2014) (reviewing
MORRIS, supra note 12).
14. See MORRIS, supra note 12, at 113.
15. Id. at 112.
16. See generally Jordan M. Singer & William G. Young, Measuring Bench Presence: Federal
District Judges in the Courtroom, 2008–2012, 118 PENN ST. L. REV. 243 (2013).
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I organize these facets as different themes, but they are not entirely
distinct.  These aspects of judging are interrelated; they overlap, and
some even appear to be in tension with each other.  In describing
judging, the United States Supreme Court has recently emphasized
that the role of judges is gate-keeping and gate-closing—closing the
gates of the courts to litigants.17  Judges must keep a tight hold on
access to court.  The frames that I use to capture the dimensions of
Judge Weinstein’s judging challenge these views.
A. Human Interest and Human Face
Judge Weinstein has extraordinary enthusiasm for “real life” and
connection with others.  His interest is the “real world”: real facts of
life and real people.  A recent article that he wrote is entitled Federal
Trial Judges: Dealing with the Real World.18  He describes the work of
federal district judges and what he loves about judging as “all the facts
of real life revealed in our work.”19  The “facts” of “real life” are
meaningful and important to him.  He loves the “kaleidoscope of
life.”20  He has a strong sense of compassion and empathy, and soli-
darity with others.21  He appears to genuinely like people and to take
joy in helping people.  He especially recognizes the special problems
of “little people.”22
This has a number of implications for his judicial work.  Judge
Weinstein is not interested only in “the law,” or just the law, or in
legal theory or doctrine.  He recognizes that facts are the context for
the law.  He has a tremendous sensitivity to facts.  He has said that the
statement of facts in his opinions is most important,23 and that he
“work[s] at the statement of facts more than [he] work[s] at the state-
ment of law.”24  He wants to do real problem solving for actual peo-
ple.  Judge Weinstein is obviously brilliant, interested in, and prolific
on, many complex issues of legal theory, but his engagement with real
17. See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993) (describing the
“gatekeeping role” and responsibility of the judge).  Recent cases have expanded the gatekeep-
ing functions of the judge. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
18. Jack B. Weinstein, Federal Trial Judges: Dealing with the Real World, 69 U. MIAMI L. REV.
(forthcoming 2015).
19. Id.
20. See MORRIS, supra note 12, at 56.
21. Anita Bernstein, The Feminist Jurisprudence of Jack B. Weinstein, 64 DEPAUL L. REV. 341
(2015).
22. See MORRIS, supra note 12, at 188.
23. Id. at 91.
24. MORRIS, supra note 12, at 91–92.
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people and their lives is what drives his work.  He is interested not just
in law in the abstract, but very much in the concrete.
Many federal judges, like the smart law students they were, are in-
terested primarily in the law.  Law schools traditionally focus on the
law and legal doctrine.  A federal circuit court appointment is viewed
as more prestigious than a district court appointment.  Interpreting
legal doctrine, making new law, and reviewing district judges is viewed
as a big deal; less so than the people involved in the case, the facts of
the case, or finding solutions for their problems.  “We are a court of
law,” said Judge Winter of the Second Circuit in the Agent Orange
appeal, sharply rebuking Judge Weinstein.25  Although Judge Wein-
stein grapples deeply and brilliantly with law and legal theory, the bal-
ance he strikes is different.
One other example of his sensitivity to facts is especially significant
in light of the Supreme Court’s recent decisions on gate-closing in
pleading.  These cases have been widely interpreted as encouraging
district judges to dismiss cases on the pleadings, without any opportu-
nity for factual development or discovery.  In his instructions to his
law clerks, Judge Weinstein says that he does not want to hear mo-
tions addressed to the pleadings that are submitted by lawyers be-
cause they are not presented on a full factual record, and he tells
lawyers not to make them.26  This is also an important issue of access
to courts.
Another aspect of Judge Weinstein’s “human face” is how he con-
ducts himself in court.27  He comes off the bench, talks face-to-face
with both lawyers and litigants in the well of the courtroom, and does
not wear judicial robes.28  He does not like the formal manifestations
of “status.”  He is very interested in connection with litigants—having
hearings, televising testimony, talking face-to-face, meeting with vic-
tims, and investigating the way in which new technology makes this
more possible.29  He wants to expand these opportunities.  He wants
to make court proceedings more litigant friendly.  Judge Weinstein
wants to break through “bureaucratic gobbledygook” in pro se, Social
25. Id. at 333.
26. Jack B. Weinstein, The Roles of a Federal District Court Judge, 76 BROOK. L REV. 439,
439, 441–42 (2011) (spelling out his “views [that] orient new law clerks to some of my principles
and practices” and that “may also be useful to those who appear before me”).
27. See MORRIS, supra note 12, at 188.
28. Id. at 101.  A recent article described Claudia Wilken, United States District Judge for the
Northern District of California, as “unpretentious” because she “insist[ed] that no one rise when
she enter[ed] the courtroom.”  John Branch, Judge in N.C.A.A. Case Known as Evenhanded,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2014, at D1.
29. See MORRIS, supra note 12, at 196–98, 322.
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Security, and government benefit cases—the cases that many district
judges wish would disappear from their dockets.30
B. Gate-Opening
Judge Weinstein often uses the term “gate-opening.”  This is so
striking in light of the  Supreme Court’s emphasis on gate-keeping and
gate-closing.31  Jeffrey Morris describes Judge Weinstein’s view that
judges should be more like “gate-openers” than “gate-closers.”32
Gate-opening is a phrase that Judge Weinstein used as a title for a
report on Daubert: Opening the Gates of Law to Science.33  In a lec-
ture on Maimonides, Judge Weinstein also used the metaphor of
opening the gate several times:
[T]he “invisible aspect to justice that cannot be ignored” . . . is “the
aspect of humanity, of the human spirit, and of the empathy we feel
for our fellow men and women,” that “is the gate to justice that
gives life and reason to our work as lawyers and judges.  We must,”
[Judge Weinstein] said, “try to open the gate between the head of
the law and the hearts of those who seek justice from us.”34
In his judging, Judge Weinstein “opens the gates” intellectually and
humanly.  He is open to people and other influences: magistrates, spe-
cial masters, scientific experts, as well as jurors.  He is also open to
other sources of law, science, and other fields of information.  But he
emphasizes that judges must exercise humility in their consideration
of other sources of law or information.  For example, in a discussion of
the use of foreign law by United States judges, Judge Weinstein says:
There should be no inhibition about using foreign state and inter-
national law as authority, either as a model, or, as is more often
occurring, as dispositive authority on a substantive law issue.  Re-
jecting this rich source of knowledge is a form of xenophobia un-
worthy of our creative American legal system.  Care must be taken
by seeking assistance from the lawyers and their experts before in-
corporating this information into a decision.  There is danger in
transplanting foreign norms and principles into a subtly different
American context, given its uniquely diverse population and distinc-
tive legal tradition.  Much of the same sense of humility is required
before we rely on scientific or other special fields of knowledge.35
30. Id. at 188–94.
31. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
32. See MORRIS, supra note 12, at 309.
33. Id. at 309 n.201 (citing Jack B. Weinstein, Scientific Evidence in the United States Federal
Courts: Opening the Gates of Law to Science, in FIRST WORLDWIDE COMMON LAW JUDICIARY
CONFERENCE, WILLIAMSBURG, VA. & WASHINGTON, D.C., May 23–28, at 137, 145).
34. Id. at 311 (quoting Jack B. Weinstein, Speech at Temple Emanuel, Great Neck, NY: Mai-
monides’ Tempering of a Justice too Rigid and Cruel for Humanity 6 (Aug. 6, 1999)).
35. Weinstein, supra note 26, at 453 (citations omitted).
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I see this as another dimension of Judge Weinstein’s “struggle against
. . . status to wall off public access to the courts.”36  He does not want
to close himself off.  Access can include both a fuller recognition of
law and other sources, and humility in the consideration of those
sources as well.37
Judge Weinstein’s “opening the gate” is also manifested in both his
desire to listen and to hear—which is not always the same.  He wants
to get out of the courthouse, do site visits, bring kindergartners into
the courtroom to sit in the jury box, and to be a judge in the real
world.38  He rejects the fancy trappings, the robe, the bench, and the
separation from litigants and lawyers.39  He wants a direct connection
with lawyers and litigants.  And finally, he wants to reach litigants in
mass tort cases, to make proceedings understandable and accessible—
which is now possible with technology and new methods of teleconfer-
encing.  This also relates to issues of democratization.40
C. Democratization
Judge Weinstein’s democratizing impulse can be seen in his anti-
elitism and his concern with judicial privilege.  Judge Weinstein’s rec-
ognition of the importance of judicial humility41 is reflected in his
views on the role of the jury.  He is a judge who understands that
judges are limited by their own privilege, as well as gender, race,
ethnicity, class, age, and many other factors.  He values the additional
perspectives provided by a jury.  For this reason, he, often seeks juries
in an “advisory” capacity.
I first saw this democratic dimension of Judge Weinstein when stud-
ying cases on summary judgment that involved gender discrimina-
tion.42  Two of Judge Weinstein’s cases, Gallagher v. Delaney43 and
Ganzy v. Allen Christian School,44 really stood out.  Michelle Ganzy
was an unmarried teacher in a church-affiliated school, who was fired
36. MORRIS, supra note 12, at 195–96.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 91, 208, 234.
39. Id. at 101.
40. Jack B. Weinstein, The Democratization of Mass Actions in the Internet Age, 45 COLUM.
J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 451, 462–64 (2012).
41. The importance of judicial humility is something several scholars have discussed. See, e.g.,
Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going To Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of
Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 894–902 (2009); Schneider, Dangers, supra note 1,
at 766–67.
42. See generally Schneider, Dangers, supra note 1.
43. 139 F.3d. 338 (2d Cir. 1998) (Weinstein, J., sitting by designation).
44. 995 F. Supp. 340 (E.D.N.Y 1998).
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when she became pregnant.45  She sued the school under Title VII and
state employment statutes.46  The school took the position that Ms.
Ganzy was fired because of sexual activity outside of marriage, which
violated the school’s religious policy, and not because of pregnancy,
which would constitute gender discrimination.47  Judge Weinstein
wrote a lengthy opinion exploring legal questions of pregnancy, sexu-
ality, women’s employment, and discrimination in faith-based con-
texts, placing these issues in a broader social and historical
framework.48  He denied summary judgment, emphasizing that
[t]he complex history of women’s rights, employment, and sexuality
. . . as well as normal methods of determining witnesses’ credibility,
might lead different jurors to evaluate differently the veracity of the
witnesses and the honesty of the Defendant’s proffered reason for
dismissal.  Under such circumstances, a decision by a cross-section
of the community in a jury trial is appropriate.49
In Gallagher v. Delaney, sitting on the Second Circuit, Judge Wein-
stein wrote an opinion emphasizing the importance of the jury, espe-
cially in employment discrimination cases, because “[a] federal judge
is not in the best position to define the current sexual tenor of Ameri-
can cultures in their many manifestations.”50  More recently, in
Chapala v. Interfaith Medical Center,51 another employment discrimi-
nation case, Judge Weinstein wrote that
the inquiry into whether the plaintiff’s age, sex, national origin, or
race caused the conduct at issue often requires an assessment of
individuals’ motivations and state of mind.  Because juries possess
special advantages over judges in making this sort of assessment,
discrimination cases call for a “sparing” use of summary
judgment.52
In contrast with many judges, Judge Weinstein acknowledges the
“rather sheltered background” of a federal judge and values the jury
for “knowledge of how life operates outside our courthouses and our
social circle.”53  Juries possess “special advantages.”  This shows his
healthy appreciation of the limits of the role of the judge.
45. Id. at 345.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 346–59.
49. Id. at 360–61.
50. Gallagher v. Delaney, 139 F.3d 338, 342 (2d Cir. 1998).
51. No. 04 CV 3458(JBW), 2006 WL 2882567 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2006).
52. Id. at *4.
53. Jack B. Weinstein, The Role of Judges in a Government of, by and for the People: Notes for
the Fifty-Eighth Cardozo Lecture, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 118 (2008).
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But as Shari Diamond and Francis Doorley observe, Judge Wein-
stein’s view of the jury goes beyond “background” cases.54  He be-
lieves that “the jury’s power and capacity to deal with complex facts
and come to a reasonable resolution of a dispute should not be under-
estimated.”55  He believes that jurors can understand scientific evi-
dence.56  Consequently, he does not think that only the judge can
know what is going on.
And Judge Weinstein also likes to use advisory juries.57  He has
used them in cases involving gun manufacturers and unlawful CIA
surveillance.58  Here, too, on this issue Diamond and Doorley describe
Judge Weinstein as having “opened the door.”59
IV. PROCEDURALISM AND PROCESS
At first blush, there might appear to be some tension between the
facets of Judge Weinstein’s judging that I have sketched.  Judge Wein-
stein has been described as a “judge for the situation” in the mass
torts or law reform litigation context.60  Another perception of Judge
Weinstein in the legal community is that he thinks he can do any-
thing—he is an “unabashed rulebreaker.”61  Some commentators have
suggested that he goes far beyond the limits of what a judge can or
should do in an individual case.62  When he is judging, he is a one-
person administrative agency, figuring out all the ways to solve the
problem and often the underlying problem.63  As Anita Bernstein has
observed, Judge Weinstein “is large, he contains multitudes.”64  In this
sense, he is often viewed as limitless, as though he sees his judicial
authority as limitless.  He is a grand hero, larger than life; a heroic
54. Shari Seidman Diamond & Francis Doorley, What a (Very) Smart Trial Judge Knows
About Juries, 64 DEPAUL L. REV. 373, 379 (2015).
55. Id. (citing United States v. Jackson, 405 F. Supp. 938 (E.D.N.Y.1975)).
56. MORRIS, supra note 12, at 309.
57. Id. at 106.
58. Id. at 164–65, 358–60; see also Diamond & Doorley, supra note 54, at 373.
59. Diamond & Doorley, supra note 54, at 388.
60. Martha Minow, Judge for the Situation: Judge Jack Weinstein, Creator of Temporary Ad-
ministrative Agencies, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2010 (1997)
61. Howard M. Erichson, Judge Jack Weinstein and the Allure of Antiproceduralism, 64
DEPAUL L. REV. 393 (2015).
62. In his article in this Issue, Howard Erichson describes Judge Weinstein as an “an-
tiproceduralist judge.” Id. at 395.  Erichson describes himself as “a fan of procedural niceties
whose attitude towards Judge Weinstein as one mixed with “admiration and trepidation.” Id. at
394; see also Stephen B. Burbank, The Courtroom as Classroom: Independence, Imagination and
Ideology in the Work of Jack Weinstein, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1971 (1997).
63. See generally Minow, supra note 60.
64. Bernstein, supra note 21, at 359 (paraphrasing WALT WHITMAN, LEAVES OF GRASS 55
(1855)).  In addition to being an intellectual giant, Judge Weinstein is very tall.
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judge in an “antiheroic age,” as David Luban put it.65  But he also has
an appreciation for humility, especially regarding the limits of the role
of the judge and the important role of the jury.  How can these im-
pulses be reconciled?
First, judges are not necessarily internally consistent in their atti-
tudes and rulings, either doctrinally or in their judicial inclinations;
their views and judicial impulses are complex and nuanced.  However,
I have come to see the facets of Judge Weinstein’s judging that I have
described as interconnected.  Because Judge Weinstein has an appre-
ciation for people and for the significance of facts, he values broader
influences in decision making and wants to “open the door” of the
courthouse.  His appreciation for people and openness to broader in-
fluences also relates to his valuing of the jury.  He can see that a wider
and more diverse group of decision makers could offer perspectives
that he does not have.  He recognizes the degree to which he is situ-
ated and limited, as we all are, by his own experience: his class, race,
background, gender, ethnicity, social circle, and age.66  He under-
stands that these aspects of his experience shape and limit his judg-
ment.  He views the inclusion of different and broader perspectives as
a good thing, so he not only questions summary judgment, but reaches
for a jury in an advisory capacity when other judges would not.
But when Judge Weinstein believes that he does have the judicial
authority, or sees himself as having it, he often does not just want to
decide the case, but to grapple with the broader problem that is at the
heart of the case.  This has been especially true in the mass torts cases,
which he sees as posing important social issues.67  And he wants to get
over the procedural hurdles, and get to the merits.  But he still does it
without the superficial trappings of status and authority, without
robes, and face-to-face with lawyers and litigants.
I suggest that one lesson to draw from Judge Weinstein’s judging is
the importance of a richer understanding of proceduralism.  There is
not one simple form of proceduralism, but many facets.   Judge Wein-
stein sees proceduralism in a way that is not simply technical or fol-
lowing the rules.  He sees a duty of proceduralists to expose
“procedural camouflage” and substantive impact.  For Judge Wein-
stein, procedure relates to all aspects of experience.  The “head” of
65. David Luban, Heroic Judging in an Antiheroic Age, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2064, 2089 (1997).
66. This issue of federal district judges as “situated” within their own experience has been
much discussed. See Schneider, Changing Shape of Pretrial Practice, supra note 1, at 563–70
(2010) (discussing Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s United States Supreme Court confirmation hearing
and issues of cognitive bias in judging).
67. Weinstein, supra note 10, at 261–74.
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the law must be connected to the “heart” of justice.  The methods and
manner by which he makes decisions matter and are meaningful in
themselves.  All dimensions of procedure, judicial decisions, and judi-
cial conduct, in the courtroom and in the world, make meaning.  The
commonality is that they have human, and thus deeply substantive,
dimensions.
680 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:669
